Every day, one story that matters, broken down into three numbered scenarios, each with its own probability. Never fixed — it shifts as the situation changes.
Scénario
Thursday, global economy & finance
Some Cities Are Now Richer Than Whole Countries
Published on September 10, 2026
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The question at hand
A handful of global cities already carry more economic weight than entire countries: can states take back control, or will cities go on concentrating even more power?
The facts
On 28 July 2026, Fortune published its annual ranking of the world's 500 largest companies by revenue. The most striking detail isn't the name of the top company, but the geography of the entire list: just five cities — Beijing, Tokyo, New York, London, and Paris — host the headquarters of nearly a quarter of these 500 groups, out of 242 cities spread across 36 countries. Beijing keeps the top spot for the thirteenth year running with 42 headquarters, ahead of Tokyo (26) and New York (15). This isn't a statistical fluke: it's the visible symptom of a deeper shift in how economic power is distributed among countries themselves.
Taken on its own, a handful of metropolises already outweigh entire countries. The New York metro area alone produces about $2.3 trillion in wealth per year (2023, Bureau of Economic Analysis) — almost as much as Italy or Canada, two entire G7 economies. Greater Tokyo, with roughly $1.8 trillion, weighs in at about the same level as Spain or Australia taken as a whole. The Paris region alone (Île-de-France) produces €860 billion a year — over 30% of France's GDP* for 18% of its population — more on its own than the whole of Belgium ($664 billion). And Shenzhen, a Chinese city that barely existed as an industrial center 45 years ago, now produces roughly $510 billion a year, a level close to Austria's.
The most extreme case remains Singapore, unique in being both a city and a full-fledged state: with $547 billion in GDP in 2024 for under 6 million residents, it ranks 28th out of 196 countries worldwide — ahead of nearly 170 of them. Dubai follows a similar logic without having the same status: the emirate, which barely registers in its own country's oil reserves, has built a trade and finance economy worth roughly $117 billion for 3.7 million residents, a level many countries with tens of millions of people never reach.
Understanding it
This shift already has a name in social science, coined well before the 2026 figures came along to confirm it.
In 1991, sociologist Saskia Sassen coined the concept of the "global city*": a handful of metropolises (New York, London, Tokyo, at the time) become the command nodes of a globalized economy — corporate headquarters, financial markets, international law firms — increasingly independent from the national territory surrounding them. What the 2026 figures confirm is that this club of cities hasn't shrunk since: it has simply grown, from New York all the way to Shenzhen.
Faced with this concentration, countries haven't stood still. In 2021, 140 countries agreed under the OECD's aegis on a 15% global minimum tax* on multinationals' profits, precisely to stop groups from booking their profits wherever taxes are lowest — often in or via these same headquarters cities. But on 5 January 2026, the OECD published a so-called "side-by-side" package that effectively exempts multinationals headquartered in the United States from most of this tax, in exchange for the US Treasury formally staying in the agreement. One of the main tools meant to rebalance the relationship between countries and corporate headquarters has therefore just been weakened, barely a year after it took effect.
Here's the paradox: the more a handful of cities concentrates global wealth, the more it fuels, inside the very countries that host them, political anger against that concentration*. Economist Andrés Rodríguez-Pose has documented this as the "revenge of the places that don't matter": people in regions left behind increasingly vote against a system that lets their capital cities soar without them. We showed this yesterday at the French scale: France itself is splitting into metropolises, banlieues, and rural areas living in increasingly different ways — a mechanism found, at a completely different scale, between global metropolises and the countries struggling to keep pace with them.
This shift shows up first in the raw numbers. Here's how five metropolises or city-states, from largest to smallest in absolute terms, compare with the national economies closest to their size:
Cities vs. countries, GDP compared
1New York (metro area) — ≈ $2.3T2023, Bureau of Economic Analysis · comparable to the whole of Italy or Canada (≈ $2.37-2.39T each, 2024).
2Greater Tokyo — ≈ $1.8TLatest available estimate (Japanese data) · comparable to Spain ($1.72T) or Australia ($1.75T), 2024.
3Île-de-France (Paris) — €860B (≈ $930B)2023, INSEE · more than the whole of Belgium ($664B, 2024).
4Shenzhen — ¥3.68T yuan (≈ $510B)2024, official Chinese data · on par with the whole of Austria ($509-536B, 2024).
5Singapore (city-state) — $547B2024 · 28th-largest GDP worldwide out of 196 countries surveyed, ahead of nearly 170 of them.
Five different roads to the same result: finance and corporate headquarters (New York, London), industry and exports (Shenzhen), tax and port appeal (Singapore, Dubai), or decades of inherited concentration (Paris, Tokyo).
The idea that a city could outweigh a kingdom isn't new. It has already happened once in history, on a very different scale — and it didn't end with the cities winning.
Understanding it
A historical precedent already exists, and its outcome is worth knowing before jumping to conclusions.
For more than 400 years, the Hanseatic League* brought together over 200 merchant cities across Northern Europe, without ever becoming a state. It negotiated treaties with kings, imposed trade blockades, and even won wars against kingdoms. It eventually disappeared in the 17th century, not defeated by another city, but absorbed by the rise of modern nation-states — better equipped to levy taxes, law, and armies across an entire territory.
That's exactly today's tension: today's metropolises resemble, in economic weight, the Hanseatic cities of the past — but today's countries also have tools medieval kings never had: internationally coordinated taxation, digital regulation, regional reindustrialization policies. The numbers already settle the first question: yes, a handful of metropolises already outweigh entire countries. The real uncertainty is about what comes next — will countries manage to take back some of the ground they've let slip, or will the trend instead accelerate.
Global GDP produced by the 600 largest cities≈ 60% (McKinsey Global Institute, 2025 projection)
Fortune Global 500 headquarters in the top 5 cities≈ 25% (July 2026)
Favorable, stable, or degraded
Will countries take back control from the metropolises?
What we're assessing
FavorableCountries regain real fiscal and economic leverage over the metropolises, without breaking their momentum.
StableThe metropolises keep their current edge, with no clear break in either direction.
DegradedConcentration accelerates further, while tax cooperation between countries erodes.
Favorable
20%
Unlikely
A truly enforced global minimum tax rebalances the scales
Countries that approved the January 2026 "side-by-side" package walk back the exemption granted to American multinationals, or manage to limit it in practice through their own national safeguard clauses. At the same time, regional reindustrialization policies redirect some investment away from headquarters cities alone. The balance of power shifts without Beijing, New York, or Tokyo losing their role — they simply stop expanding it further.
This is the least likely of the three scenarios, because it requires international tax cooperation that has just suffered a concrete setback with the January 2026 US exemption. Less likely than stable, which requires no break in the trend. Also less likely than degraded, since competition between jurisdictions to attract headquarters and capital remains structurally intact.
Indicators affected
Global GDP in the 600 largest cities56-58% (slight pullback)↓(vs ≈ 60% in 2025)
Fortune 500 headquarters in the top 5 cities21-23% (slight pullback)↓(vs ≈ 25% in July 2026)
The France angle
Genuine international tax cooperation benefits state revenue and French and European companies that have been disadvantaged since January 2026 against exempted American groups. ↑ Rather favorable for France.
Stable
45%
Likely
The metropolises keep their edge, with no new break
The US exemption from the global minimum tax stays in place, neither expanded nor corrected, and the big metropolises keep attracting headquarters, capital, and talent at today's pace. Regional rebalancing policies exist, but remain too limited in scale to reverse the underlying trend. The club of cities that outweigh a country widens slightly, with no major upheaval on either side.
This is the most likely of the three scenarios, because it extends a trajectory that has been under way for decades, with no dated event to clearly accelerate or reverse it. More likely than favorable, which would require a difficult diplomatic win after the January 2026 setback. Also more likely than degraded, since no major new trade or tax escalation is currently on the agenda.
Indicators affected
Global GDP in the 600 largest cities59-61% (near-stable)→(vs ≈ 60% in 2025)
Fortune 500 headquarters in the top 5 cities24-26% (near-stable)→(vs ≈ 25% in July 2026)
The France angle
Paris remains the only French metropolis in the global club of very large urban economies, but the rest of the country doesn't directly benefit, and French companies remain structurally disadvantaged against American groups exempt from the minimum tax. ↓ Rather unfavorable for France.
Degraded
35%
Likely
Concentration accelerates, tax cooperation erodes
Other countries follow the American example and negotiate their own carve-outs from the global minimum tax, gutting much of the substance of the 2021 agreement. A new wave of trade tensions or technological fragmentation pushes companies to retreat to a smaller number of cities seen as the safest, which mechanically boosts their relative weight. The winning metropolises widen the gap further, while tax competition* between jurisdictions to keep them intensifies.
This scenario remains less likely than stable, since it requires a broader collapse of international tax cooperation, not just the exemption already in place. But it is more likely than favorable, because every recent signal — the January 2026 exemption, the drop in the number of Chinese companies on this year's Fortune ranking — points toward a weakening of rebalancing tools, not their strengthening.
Indicators affected
Global GDP in the 600 largest cities63-66% (further rise)↑(vs ≈ 60% in 2025)
Fortune 500 headquarters in the top 5 cities28-31% (further rise)↑(vs ≈ 25% in July 2026)
The France angle
Heightened tax competition and trade fragmentation weigh on state revenue and on the competitiveness of French and European groups, already disadvantaged by the American exemption. ↓ Rather unfavorable for France.
Indicative orders of magnitude for the 3 scenarios above, estimated with the information available at publication and re-assessed if the situation changes — never guaranteed forecasts. Learn more about our method →
Key takeaways
A handful of global cities already carry more economic weight than entire countries: will states regain ground, or will cities keep concentrating ever more power?
New York alone produces almost as much wealth as all of Italy or Canada, and five cities (Beijing, Tokyo, New York, London, Paris) already concentrate a quarter of the headquarters on the 2026 Fortune Global 500 ranking.
The most likely outcome (45%): the metropolises keep their edge with no clear break, while the January 2026 American exemption keeps weakening the global minimum tax meant to rebalance the scales between countries and corporate headquarters.
Signal to watch: whether other countries in turn secure a carve-out from the OECD's global minimum tax, or whether the 2027 Fortune Global 500 ranking confirms or reverses the current concentration of headquarters.
Fairly negative
Our assessment of the impact for France: fairly negative. The stable scenario, the most likely (45%), keeps an existing disadvantage for French and European companies in place without making it worse; the degraded scenario (35%) would make it worse. Together, these two scenarios carry an 80% probability, against just 20% for a genuine rebalancing in favor of countries.
Gross domestic product: the value of everything a country — or, here, a city — produces in a year, the standard yardstick for the size of an economy.
Global city
A concept coined in 1991 by sociologist Saskia Sassen to describe the handful of metropolises (New York, London, Tokyo...) that command the globalized economy, increasingly independent from the country around them.
Metropolisation
The growing concentration of population, skilled jobs, and wealth in big cities, at the expense of mid-sized towns and rural areas.
Hanseatic League
A network of more than 200 merchant cities across Northern Europe that dominated regional trade for over 400 years, without ever becoming a state, before disappearing with the rise of modern nation-states.
Global minimum tax
A 15% floor tax rate on multinationals' profits, negotiated in 2021 by 140 countries under the OECD's aegis to limit the artificial shifting of profits to the lowest-tax jurisdictions.
Tax competition
The race between countries lowering their taxes to attract, or keep, large fortunes and companies.
