Every day, one story that matters, broken down into three numbered scenarios, each with its own probability. Never fixed — it shifts as the situation changes.
Scénario
Monday, geopolitics
US-China: Trade Truce on the Brink
Publié le 21 septembre 2026
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The question at hand
Three days before the Trump-Xi summit, can the US-China tariff truce be extended, or is the trade war about to flare up again?
The facts
On September 24, 2026, Xi Jinping is due to visit the White House to meet Donald Trump: it will be the first state visit by a Chinese leader to Washington in ten years. Ahead of the meeting, two negotiators laid the groundwork: US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, who oversees trade talks, met in New York on September 14. The stated goal isn't a comprehensive treaty but something more modest and yet crucial: whether the tariff truce in place since October 2025 will be extended, or whether it collapses, reviving a trade war that already rattled global markets last year.
This truce dates back to the Busan summit in South Korea on October 30, 2025, which ended a dizzying escalation in which US tariffs on Chinese goods had reached 145% in April 2025, with China retaliating with reciprocal tariffs of 125%. Since then, these rates have fallen sharply, but peace remains partial: Beijing still maintains a 10% tax on all US goods, with targeted surtaxes in certain sectors. A second round of talks was held in Beijing on May 14, 2026, during a state visit by Trump, without fully removing uncertainty about what comes next.
Understanding it
A tariff truce is not a treaty: it can be undone with a single presidential stroke of the pen.
Unlike a standard trade agreement ratified by parliaments, this truce rests on a tacit understanding between two leaders, revisable at any moment by simple decree on the American side. It's like a verbal ceasefire between two feuding neighbors: it holds as long as neither changes their mind, but with no written guarantee to stop either one from going back on it overnight.
Behind the numbers, the balance of power remains uneven. Total trade between the two countries reached $400.8B between January and August 2026, up 5.4% year-on-year, with Chinese exports accounting for 75% of that total — a fact that has irritated Washington for years. Beijing, for its part, is on track to post a trade surplus of roughly $1,000B for the second consecutive year, evidence that the Chinese economy has weathered US tariffs better than expected, buoyed in particular by strong exports and investment in artificial intelligence.
This trade imbalance is only the visible part of a deeper, longer-running disagreement: for years, Washington has accused Beijing of unfair trade practices (massive subsidies, industrial overcapacity dumped on export markets), while China denounces what it sees as arbitrary US protectionist measures. According to Dan Wang, China director at Eurasia Group, Xi Jinping would not travel to Washington without guarantees of concrete results on tariffs or a truce extension: a visit with nothing in return would be seen as a diplomatic weakness for Beijing, which last year also regained its strategic edge on rare earths to pressure Washington on tariffs.
The timing adds further pressure: according to Reuters, the real goal of the September 24 meeting is to determine whether an extension of the truce will be announced, with the White House itself seeking to lower expectations of a major breakthrough. But the negotiating table isn't limited to trade: Taiwan, Iran and artificial intelligence could all be added to the mix, complicating any agreement, with some of the United States' Asian allies fearing that Taiwan could become little more than a bargaining chip for Trump to use against Xi. This peripheral risk was already analyzed in depth in our September 14 edition on Chinese military pressure around Taiwan — this Monday, the angle shifts: it's the trade and tariff thread that takes center stage, with Taiwan only coming into play as a factor that could derail the economic discussion; we've already touched on a similar topic, so feel free to read our article to learn more.
Understanding it
Why a military issue like Taiwan can derail a purely trade-focused negotiation.
In current China-US diplomacy, issues are almost never negotiated in isolation: Taiwan, Iran, tariffs and AI form a single overall package. It's a bit like a salary negotiation where pay, hours and remote work are all discussed at once: giving ground on one point can serve as a bargaining chip on another, which leaves each issue hostage to the others.
It is precisely this pile-up of sensitive issues stacked on top of an already fragile truce that makes the summit's outcome hard to predict, and that justifies thinking in terms of three distinct scenarios rather than a single forecast. A clear, documented agreement would immediately reassure markets, which have in fact already priced in some easing this week, with Chinese stock indices rising sharply. A vague status quo would prolong uncertainty without resolving it. And a failure, triggered by a provocation over Taiwan or a disagreement over Iran — where China remains the top buyer of oil despite US sanctions — would immediately revive the risk of a new tariff escalation with global consequences, just weeks before the US midterm elections in November.
China's 2026 trade surplus (projected)~$1,000B Stable/rising, 2nd consecutive year at this level
US tariffs on Chinese goods (peak, April 2025)145% Sharply down since then, effective rate at 22.8% in July 2026
Favorable, stable, or degraded
Will the US-China trade truce survive the September 24 summit?
What we're assessing
FavorableLe sommet débouche sur une prolongation claire de la trêve, avec des gestes concrets qui rassurent les marchés mondiaux.
StableUn accord flou et non contraignant prolonge le statu quo tarifaire sans résoudre les tensions de fond.
DégradéLe sommet échoue sur Taïwan ou l'Iran, la trêve s'effondre et de nouvelles surtaxes réciproques relancent la guerre commerciale.
Favorable
35%
Likely
Trump and Xi announce a clear extension of the truce
In this scenario, the September 24 summit produces a concrete announcement: a written framework for reciprocal tariff reductions, covering roughly $30B worth of goods on each side according to China's Ministry of Commerce, accompanied by goodwill gestures such as a resumption of Chinese purchases of American soybeans or Boeing aircraft, with a broader deal even floated around 500 planes. The China-US councils on trade and investment, created at the May summit in Beijing, would then be formally activated to defuse future friction before it turns into a new tariff crisis.
This scenario stands apart from the stable scenario by the existence of written, quantified commitments, not merely a verbal statement extending the status quo. Above all, it differs from the deteriorated scenario in the absence of a slip-up over Taiwan or Iran: the two leaders would explicitly choose to compartmentalize the issues, treating trade separately from geopolitical tensions, rather than letting a military or diplomatic deadlock contaminate the economic discussion, as Washington's Asian allies fear.
Droits de douane US sur produits chinoisBaisse ciblée sur secteurs clés↓22,8% taux effectif (juillet 2026)
The France angleA confirmed truce would stabilize global supply chains, including French exports to China and the United States. ↑ Rather favorable for France.
Stable
45%
Fairly likely
A vague agreement extends the status quo without resolving it
In this scenario, Trump and Xi announce in general terms that the truce will continue, without precise figures or any new binding commitment — a way for both sides to save face without actually moving forward. Tariffs would remain at their current level, with an effective US rate of 22.8% on Chinese goods and China's 10% tax on US goods unchanged. Taiwan, Iran and artificial intelligence would be discussed but pushed to future talks, without any of them formally derailing the summit.
This scenario differs from the favorable one in the absence of concrete, measurable gestures: no new agricultural purchases announced, no timetable for tariff cuts. It differs from the deteriorated scenario in the absence of an open break: neither side formally reignites the escalation, unlike the 145%/125% peak seen in April 2025. This is the wait-and-see scenario, in which the fragility of the truce is neither resolved nor publicly exposed, leaving doubt hanging until the next point of friction, potentially around the US midterm elections in November.
Droits de douane US sur produits chinois22,8% taux effectif, inchangé→22,8% taux effectif (juillet 2026)
The France angleThe status quo maintains persistent trade uncertainty that is already weighing on the forecasts of French exporters and manufacturers exposed to China. ↓ Rather unfavorable for France.
Degraded
20%
Unlikely
The summit fails and new surtaxes are announced
In this scenario, an open disagreement over Taiwan — for example over $14B worth of US arms sales, which Trump himself has described as a "bargaining chip" — or a fresh provocation linked to Iran (where China remains the top buyer of oil despite sanctions) derails the summit, or even leads to its cancellation or downgrading to a mere technical meeting. The truce would then collapse, with a possible return to reciprocal surtaxes close to the extreme levels reached in April 2025, when US tariffs climbed to 145% and Chinese tariffs to 125%.
This scenario differs radically from the other two through a visible, dated rupture, not mere stagnation: Asian markets, which had priced in some easing with Chinese indices up roughly 1% this week, would suffer an immediate reverse shock. Unlike the stable scenario, where ambiguity temporarily benefits both sides, this deteriorated scenario would openly revive the risk of a global recession flagged by several economists, at a particularly sensitive moment for Trump ahead of the November midterm elections.
Indicators affected
Excédent commercial chinois 2026Repli possible sous 900 Md$↓~1 000 Md$ projeté
Droits de douane US sur produits chinoisRemontée vers 100%+↑22,8% taux effectif (juillet 2026)
The France angleA new tariff escalation would revive the risk of a global recession and weigh directly on French growth and exports. ↓ Rather unfavorable for France.
Ordres de grandeur indicatifs pour les 3 scénarios ci-dessus, estimés avec l'information disponible à la publication et réévalués si la situation change — jamais des prévisions garanties. Learn more about our method →
Key takeaways
The question at hand: can the fragile tariff truce between Washington and Beijing be extended at the September 24 Trump-Xi summit, or is the trade war about to flare up again?
The context: this truce, struck in October 2025 after tariffs peaked at 145% on the US side and 125% on the Chinese side, remains fragile; China is on track to post a trade surplus of roughly $1,000B for the second consecutive year, which irritates Washington.
The likely conclusion: neither a breakthrough nor a clean break — the most likely outcome (45%) is a vague agreement that extends the status quo without resolving it, while a genuine, documented extension remains possible but less likely (35%), and a full collapse (20%) remains the least probable scenario but not out of the question, particularly via Taiwan or Iran.
Signal to watch: whether or not a written, quantified tariff-reduction framework is announced at the close of the September 24, 2026 summit in Washington, along with any official Chinese confirmation of the visit before that date.
Slightly negative
Our assessment of the impact for France: slightly negative.with a 35% chance of a clear extension but a 65% combined risk of a vague status quo or an outright failure, trade uncertainty continues to weigh moderately on the outlook for French exporters exposed to China and the United States.
Si tu devais retenir 1 chose
La Chine s'apprête à enregistrer un excédent commercial d'environ 1 000 milliards de dollars pour la 2e année de suite, à trois jours du sommet Trump-Xi sur la trêve tarifaire.
A temporary agreement between two countries to suspend or reduce tariffs, without the standing of a formal treaty, and therefore revisable unilaterally at any time.
