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Scénario
Monday, geopolitics
GPS: Can the world do without GPS?
GPS jamming and spoofing in the Baltic Sea since 2023–2024 are disrupting civil aviation. How far could the escalation reach before hitting French critical infrastructure?
Publié le 5 octobre 2026
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The facts
Since the summer of 2023, the skies over the Baltic Sea have become the arena for an invisible electronic war with very tangible effects for airline pilots and civil mariners. Swedish authorities formally recorded 733 incidents of severe geolocation signal disruptions between August 2023 and the end of 2024, a phenomenon escalating almost daily that emanates primarily from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. These hybrid attacks aim not only to disorient passing aircraft, but continuously test the resilience of neighboring democracies. In this region wedged between several NATO members, airliners are sometimes forced to switch off their automated instruments to land using ground-based radio beacons or traditional charts.
To grasp this vulnerability, one must first distinguish jamming*, which drowns out a radio frequency in deafening noise to blind the receiver, from spoofing*, which is far more insidious, broadcasting fake coordinates to deceive the device without the crew immediately noticing. Signals transmitted by satellite constellations in medium Earth orbit reach the ground at minuscule power levels, comparable to the glow of a pocket flashlight viewed from several thousand kilometers away. A low-power terrestrial transmitter is therefore enough to saturate or falsify these waves over a wide radius, turning an everyday, ubiquitous technology into a major strategic Achilles’ heel.
Understanding it
Why is a satellite signal from space so easy to stifle on Earth?
Imagine someone trying to hear a whisper coming from twenty kilometers away while a neighbor blasts a megaphone right next to their ear. Satellites orbiting more than twenty thousand kilometers away transmit extremely weak signals that are easily drowned out by a rogue transmitter on the ground.
Four major constellations share global airspace: the American GPS*, Europe’s Galileo*, Russia’s GLONASS, and China’s BeiDou. While each of these space systems relies on its own satellites, they all share the same fundamental physics and remain collectively exposed to terrestrial radio interference. Faced with a surge in documented hybrid attacks, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) formally condemned repeated radio frequency interference attributed to the Russian Federation and North Korea in October 2025. This formal declaration highlights that the contest for the electromagnetic spectrum now extends beyond strictly military combat zones to destabilize international civil transport corridors.
Beyond air or maritime navigation, satellite constellations perform a mission largely unknown to the general public but vital to the modern economy: distributing universal time with nanosecond precision. France’s National Frequency Agency (ANFR) regularly warns that the synchronization of vital infrastructure relies directly on this orbital time signal. First, signal loss desynchronizes reference atomic clocks, prompting mobile telecoms equipment to multiply data transmission micro-cuts, which in turn leads automated circuit breakers on the electricity transmission grid to interpret these discrepancies as serious failures, opening the door to nuisance tripping.
Understanding it
How can a loss of satellite synchronization trip a power grid?
The power grid resembles a symphony orchestra where every power plant must play on the exact same 50-hertz alternating tempo. If the satellite conductor is jammed, the instruments fall out of sync, triggering short circuits and automated safety cutoffs to prevent transformers from burning out.
Concern is now mounting within European institutions and military headquarters over the risk of these interferences spilling geographically beyond the Baltic region. Modern Russian military transmitters based in Kaliningrad boast an estimated effective range of 450 km, capable of interfering with shipping traffic in the North Sea and reaching the industrial heart of the European continent. According to initial assessments by Western intelligence services, the temptation of asymmetric warfare without formal attribution could prompt hostile actors to indirectly target Western European stock exchange trading floors, logistics data centers, and power distribution hubs.
To counter this growing threat, the European Union activated on July 22, 2025 the OSNMA service* on its Galileo constellation, introducing a cryptographic signature that allows compatible receivers to reject fake signals forged by attackers. However, fully equipping the merchant fleet, aviation fleets, and industrial networks will take several years of technological transition. The central question is therefore no longer whether satellite positioning can be attacked, but whether our industrial societies can redeploy autonomous ground-based backup systems before a major outage paralyzes an entire swath of European economic activity.
Documented GPS jamming incidents in the Baltic Sea733 recorded by Sweden between August 2023 and end-2024
Range of combined jamming from Kaliningrad450 km estimated operating radius of electronic warfare stations
Three Trajectories Facing the Invisible War Over Positioning Signals
What we're assessing
FavorableLe déploiement rapide d'OSNMA et d'alternatives terrestres neutralise l'impact des attaques.
StableLes perturbations restent cantonnées à la Baltique avec une adaptation progressive sans rupture.
DégradéL'escalade du brouillage déborde vers l'Europe de l'Ouest et fragilise les infrastructures critiques.
Favorable
25%
Likely
Galileo OSNMA authentication and terrestrial beacons neutralize jamming
In this constructive hypothesis, the operational activation of the OSNMA authentication feature on the Galileo constellation allows civil fleets and infrastructure managers to instantly filter out falsified signals. Air and maritime carriers broadly adopt hardened multi-constellation receivers while simultaneously reviving independent ground-based radionavigation networks, such as the experimental R-Mode system in the Baltic Sea. French critical infrastructure operators install miniature local atomic clocks on their high-voltage transformers and mobile cell towers, completely eliminating their direct reliance on a single satellite signal.
Compared with the status quo scenario where disruptions continue to wear down pilots’ nerves and clog flight corridors, this trajectory turns a hybrid vulnerability into a driver of European technological independence. Rapid hardening of civil receivers discourages asymmetric electronic warfare tactics by stripping them of any practical effectiveness in the field. If public and private investments in sovereign resilience accelerate over the coming months, European critical networks’ vulnerability to substitute signals could be durably resolved.
Indicators affected
Incidents de brouillage GPS documentés en mer BaltiqueBaisse sous 100 par an↓733 recensés sur la période 2023-2024
Portée du brouillage combiné depuis KaliningradEffet résiduel nul sur récepteurs sécurisés↓450 km de portée nominale
The France angleFrench and European technological sovereignty emerges strengthened with fully immunized infrastructure. ↑ Rather favorable for France.
Stable
50%
Likely
Electronic warfare remains confined to the Baltic Sea with permanent rerouting costs
In this intermediate configuration, Russia maintains sustained electronic warfare activity from its bases in Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg to shield its military installations and maintain psychological pressure on the Nordic and Baltic states. Commercial aviation adapts by modifying flight protocols: aircraft automatically switch off satellite navigation when approaching the contested zone, relying instead on conventional inertial navigation and ground-based radar guidance. French and Western European national infrastructure remains outside the direct geographic reach of these coastal transmitters and continues operating without major disruption.
Compared with a generalized crisis scenario affecting Western power grids, this status quo keeps the threat at a localized intensity level, albeit one that is highly disruptive for regional airlines. The system settles into a permanent gray zone where flights experience chronic delays and route surcharges without triggering serious physical accidents. Our scenario assessment indicates that this contained yet structural state of tension would become the ongoing reality for regional air transport until a comprehensive diplomatic settlement is reached.
Indicators affected
Incidents de brouillage GPS documentés en mer BaltiquePlateau élevé de 600 à 800 par an→733 recensés sur la période 2023-2024
Portée du brouillage combiné depuis Kaliningrad450 km maintenus aux frontières orientales→450 km de portée nominale
The France angleIndirect economic impact through flight diversions and higher insurance costs for carriers operating to Northern Europe. ↓ Rather unfavorable for France.
Degraded
25%
Likely
Expansion of hybrid interference disrupts Western energy and financial networks
In this acute crisis trajectory, sophisticated jamming and spoofing techniques break out of the Baltic basin and are deployed from unmarked maritime vessels or covert relays close to North Sea and English Channel coasts. Satellite time signals are repeatedly degraded, causing cascading micro-desynchronizations across mobile telecom networks and disrupting regulatory timestamps for European stock trades. Power grid operators must switch to degraded manual operation to prevent automated circuit breakers from triggering massive blackouts in major industrial urban areas.
Unlike the stable scenario where only Baltic flight paths are adjusted, this drift plunges all of Western Europe into immediate operational vulnerability with major economic fallout. Existing emergency systems prove incapable of absorbing a prolonged loss of the timing synchronization signal across multiple countries at once. Our analysis shows that the resilience of essential public services and financial flows would slide into critical instability if such a proliferation of interference transmitters were to materialize on European soil.
Indicators affected
Incidents de brouillage GPS documentés en mer BaltiquePlus de 2 000 incidents étendus à toute l'Europe↑733 recensés sur la période 2023-2024
Portée du brouillage combiné depuis KaliningradPortée étendue par des relais mobiles et maritimes↑450 km de portée nominale
The France angleDirect risk of power grid desynchronization and telecommunications disruption across metropolitan territory. ↓ Rather unfavorable for France.
Ordres de grandeur indicatifs pour les 3 scénarios ci-dessus, estimés avec l'information disponible à la publication et réévalués si la situation change — jamais des prévisions garanties. Learn more about our method →
Key takeaways
Growing jamming and spoofing of satellite radionavigation signals by Russian military transmitters pose an unprecedented risk to European transport and synchronization infrastructure.
Sweden formally logged 733 incidents of severe GPS signal disruption between August 2023 and December 2024, while the range of combined interference systems now reaches 450 km from Kaliningrad.
No, the current escalation has not yet reached critical infrastructure in mainland France. Our most probable scenario (50%) projects that disruption will remain geographically confined to the Baltic region, compared to a favorable technological neutralization scenario (25%) and a degraded scenario of spillover to Western European power and telecom grids (25%).
The industrial rollout of receivers compatible with the European Galileo OSNMA authentication standard among airlines and grid operators by end-2026 will serve as the key resilience indicator.
Fairly negative
Our assessment of the impact for France: fairly negative.the combined prevalence of the disruptive status quo scenario (50%) and the hybrid escalation trajectory (25%) imposes security surcharges and maintains residual vulnerability for our energy and transport infrastructure.
Si tu devais retenir 1 chose
Avec 733 incidents de brouillage GPS recensés en mer Baltique et une portée de 450 km depuis Kaliningrad, la guerre des signaux menace la synchronisation de nos réseaux critiques.
Deliberate emission of powerful radio waves on the same frequency as a legitimate signal to saturate receivers and make them completely unable to receive positioning data.
spoofing
Transmission of counterfeit satellite signals that deceive the target receiver by feeding it a false geographic location or incorrect time without its awareness.
GPS
Global Positioning System, an American constellation of navigation satellites providing highly accurate geographic coordinates and time to civil and military users worldwide.
Galileo
European civil satellite navigation constellation offering millimeter-level positioning accuracy and advanced signal authentication features to ensure authenticity.
OSNMA
Open Service Navigation Message Authentication, Galileo’s cryptographic protocol that embeds a tamper-proof digital signature into the signal to prevent spoofing attempts.
