Hybrid warfare in Europe: is Russia sabotaging the EU?

First scenario: Western nations decide to expose the clandestine operations. Faced with mounting police evidence and intelligence assessments, European governments and the Atlantic Alliance publish a joint report detailing the responsibility of Russian intelligence services. This diplomatic attribution is immediately accompanied by a new package of financial sanctions targeting logistics networks and middlemen involved in recruiting operatives. Critical infrastructure, particularly railways and energy terminals, sees a massive expansion of physical and digital surveillance. By showcasing political unity and detection capabilities without resorting to force, European democracies draw a clear red line that prompts Kremlin strategists to pause physical attacks to avoid losing access to their remaining economic footholds in Europe.

This diplomatic and security outcome remains a minority likelihood compared to the two other forward-looking paths, which together account for 75% of the probabilities. Unlike the status quo scenario where inaction encourages repeated vandalism, public attribution restores a deterrent balance of power without risking the direct confrontation feared in the escalation scenario. However, the effectiveness of this response hinges on the political will of major continental powers to shoulder heightened diplomatic friction with Moscow. If the EU-27 manage to agree on stringent sanctions at upcoming international summits, this strategic course could restore tangible security to European transport networks while curbing the risks of armed escalation.

Second scenario: the silent conflict becomes a permanent fixture of European daily life. National authorities continue arresting paid operatives for arson or severed cables, but avoid directly accusing the Russian leadership to steer clear of forced military escalation. Handling these attacks remains entrusted to domestic intelligence agencies and police forces, who adapt surveillance protocols by tightening security around sensitive industrial sites. Disruptions across rail and maritime networks become frequent yet diffuse enough not to paralyze the continent’s economy. This security gray zone forces states to increase homeland protection spending without ever officially declaring the existence of coordinated foreign aggression, preserving a fragile surface peace.

Our assessment places this path at the forefront of our hypotheses with a dominant 50% probability, outpacing both the sanction-based resolution (25%) and an open military crisis (25%). This scenario reflects the historical reluctance of Western democracies to step into an overt confrontation with a nuclear-armed adversary. By absorbing isolated shocks without altering their defense posture, European countries avoid triggering mutual defense clauses, though at the cost of eroding public perceptions of security. This tense coexistence would become the operational standard if allies opt for caution during autumn ministerial deliberations, perpetuating an invisible war of attrition.

Third scenario: the strategy of indirect strikes spirals into a material and human disaster. An attack on a major rail switching hub, a hospital, or a strategic gas pipeline causes heavy civilian casualties in an Eastern European member state. Spurred by public outrage and the gravity of the strike, the affected country invokes Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty to demand immediate retaliatory measures. Russian denials are dismissed by public opinion, and allies deploy reinforced military patrols across the Baltic Sea and along eastern borders. The interception of an unidentified drone or the boarding of a suspicious vessel triggers an initial exchange of fire at sea, transforming a covert sabotage operation into a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russian armed forces.

This escalatory path remains limited to a 25% probability in our analysis, tied with the sanctions response scenario but well behind the prolonged status quo at 50%. Unlike the quiet management of intelligence agencies, human casualties would wipe out Western leaders’ diplomatic room for maneuver and make a visible response inevitable. The peril lies in the inability to control the subsequent stages of an armed standoff once the Kremlin brandishes its non-conventional arsenal. Should an act of sabotage accidentally breach allied military leaderships’ tolerance threshold, the crisis could swiftly slide into open confrontation with an uncontrollable outcome.